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1. INTRODUCTION
RSA17 is one of the most popular cryptosystems in the 
history of cryptology. Let us briefly describe the idea of RSA 
as follows:
primes • p, q, with q<p< 2q,
N•	  = pq, f(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1),
e, d•	  are such that ed =1+ kf(N), k ≥ 1,
N•	 , e are publicly available and plaintext M is encrypted as 
C ≡ Me mod N,
The secret key • d is required to decrypt the ciphertext as 
M ≡ Cd mod N.
The study of RSA is one of the most attractive areas in 
cryptology research as evident from many excellent works1,10,15. 
Rivest17, et al. itself presents a probabilistic polynomial time 
algorithm that on input N, e, d provides the factorisation of N; 
this is based on the technique provided by Miller16,18. It has been 
proved7,14 that given N, e, d, one can factor N in deterministic 
poly(log N) time provided ed ≤ N2 .
Speeding up RSA encryption and decryption is of serious 
interest and for large N as both e, d cannot be small at the same 
time. For fast encryption, it is possible to use smaller e, e.g., 
the value as small as 216 + 1 is widely believed to be a good 
candidate. For fast decryption, the value of d needs to be small. 
However, Wiener19 showed that for 
1
41
3
d N< , N can be factorised 
easily. Later, Boneh-Durfee2 increased this bound up to 
d<N0.292. Thus, use of smaller d is in general not recommended. 
In this direction, an alternative approach has been proposed 
by Wiener19 exploiting the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) 
for faster decryption. The idea is as follows:
the public exponent •	 e and the private CRT exponents 
dp and dq are used satisfying edp ≡ 1 mod (p − 1) and 
edq ≡ 1 mod (q − 1), 
the encryption is same as standard RSA,•	
to decrypt a ciphertext •	 C one needs to compute 1 p
dM C≡
mod p and 2
qdM C≡ mod q, 
using CRT, one can get the plaintext •	 NM ∈ such that 
M ≡ M1 mod p and M ≡ M2 mod q. 
This variant of RSA is popularly known as CRT-RSA. 
One may refer to Jochemsz & May12 and the references therein 
for state-of-the-art analysis on CRT-RSA. 
Let us now outline the organization of this paper. Some 
preliminaries required in this area are discussed in section 
1.1 and 1.2. A lattice-based technique was used to show that 
one can factorise N in deterministic polynomial time from the 
knowledge of N, e, dp, dq for certain ranges of dp, dq. Section 3 
concludes the paper.
1.1 Probabilistic Polynomial Time Algorithm 
Given N, e and any one of dp, dq (or both), there exists 
a well known solution to factorise N in probabilistic poly(log 
N) time with probability almost 1. An important work in this 
direction shows that with the availability of decryption oracle 
under a fault model, one can factorise N in poly(log N) time 
[3,Section 2,2] and the idea has been improved by Lenstra13.
Without loss of generality, consider that dp is available. One 
can pick any random integer W in [2, N − 1]. If gcd(W, N) ≠ 1, 
then we already have one of the factors. Else, we consider 
gcd ( 1 1pedW − − , N). First note that p divides 1 1pedW − − . This 
is because, edp ≡ 1 mod (p − 1), i.e., edp − 1= k(p − 1) for 
some positive integer k and hence 1 1pedW − − =Wk(p−1)−1 is 
divisible by p. Thus if q does not divide  1 1pedW − −  then 
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gcd(
1 1pedW − − , N) = p (this happens with probability almost 
equal to 1). If q too divides 1 1pedW − − , then gcd( 1 1pedW − − , 
N) = N and the factorisation is not possible (this happens with 
a very low probability).
Thus, when both dp, dq are available, one can calculate 
both gcd( 1 1pedW − − , N) and gcd( 1 1qedW − − , N). If both of 
them are N (which happens with a very low probability) then 
the factorisation is not possible by this method.
Given e, dp, dq and N, let us define,
T e,dp ,dq ,N = {W ∈ [2, N − 1]| gcd(W, N)=1, 
        gcd( 1 1pedW − − , N) = N and gcd( 1 1qedW − − , N) = N}
T e,dp,N = {W ∈ [2, N − 1]| gcd(W, N)=1, 
     gcd( 1 1pedW − − , N) = N} and 
T e,dq,N = {W ∈ [2, N − 1]|
     gcd(W, N)=1, gcd( 1 1qedW − − , N) = N}.
exists a unique *NW ∈ such that W ≡ w1 mod p and W ≡ w2 
mod q, and vice versa. Thus the number of such W’s is gpgq. 
It is evident that for all these W’s, we have gcd(W, N) = 1, 
N|W edp−1 − 1 and N|W edq−1 − 1. One may observe that any 
W ∈Te,dp,dq,N  can be obtained in this manner. Discarding the case 
W = 1, we get |Te,dp,dq,N | = gpgq − 1.
Consider edp − 1= k(p − 1) and edq − 1= l(q − 1). Then we 
get |Te,dp,dq,N |≥ 
2
1g  − 1, as g1 divides both gp and gq. Since ge = 
gcd(edp − 1, edq − 1) = gcd(k(p − 1), l(q − 1)), each of gp, gq 
divides ge. Thus the bounds on |Te,dp,dq,N | follow.
Given e, N, dp, dq, one can get ge easily, and thus the upper 
bound of |Te,dp,dq,N | is immediately known. If ge is bounded by 
poly(log N), then it is enough to try 2eg many distinct W’s to 
factorise N in poly(log N) time. However, from proposition 1, 
it is clear that |Te,dp,dq,N | may not be bounded by poly(log N) as 
gp,gq may not be bounded by poly(log N) in all the cases. Thus 
we have the following question, where an affirmative answer 
will transform the probabilistic algorithm to a deterministic 
one. Is it possible to identify a W ∈ [2,N − 1] \ Te,dp,dq,N  in 
poly(log N) time?
To our knowledge, an affirmative answer to the above 
question is not known. Thus, from theoretical point of 
view, getting a deterministic polynomial time algorithm for 
factorising N with the knowledge of N, e, dp,dq is important. 
We solve it using lattice-based technique.
1.2 Preliminaries on Lattices
Let us present some basics on lattice reduction techniques. 
Consider the linearly independent vectors u1,...,uω 
n∈ , where 
ω ≤ n. A lattice, spanned by {u1,...,uω}, is the set of all linear 
combinations of u1,...,uω, i.e., ω is the dimension of the lattice. 
A lattice is called full rank when ω = n. Let L be a lattice 
spanned by the linearly independent vectors u1,...,uω, where 
u1,...,uω 
n∈ . By *1u ,......,
*
wu , we denote the vectors obtained 
by applying the gram-Schmidt process to the vectors u1,...,uω.
The determinant of L is defined as 
*
1det( )
w
i iL u== ∏   , where ||.|| denotes the Euclidean norm on 
vectors. Given a polynomial ,( , )
i j
i jg x y a x y= ∑ , we define 
the Euclidean norm as  2, ,( , ) i j i jg x y a= ∑   and infinity 
norm as , ,( , ) maxi j i jg x y a∞ =  .
It is known that given a basis u1,...,uω of a lattice L, the 
LLL algorithm13 can find a new basis b1,...,bω of L with the 
following properties.
– 
2* 2 *
12i ib b +≤ , for 1 ≤ i < ω.
– For all i, if 1* *,1
i
i i i j jjb b b
−
== + µ∑ then ,
1
2i j
µ ≤ for all j.
–  
( 1) ( 1)( 2) 1
4( 1) 12 det( )
i i
i i
ib L
ω ω− + − −
ω− + ω− +≤  for i =1,...,ω.
Deterministic polynomial time algorithms has been 
presented by Coppersmith4 to find small integer roots of (i) 
polynomials in a single variable mod N, and of (ii) polynomials 
in two variables over the integers. The idea of Coppersmith4 
extends to more than two variables also, but in that event, the 
method becomes heuristic.
Table 1. Cardinality of Te,dp,dq,N : some toy examples
p q e dp dq |Te,dp,N | | Te,dq,N | | Te,dp,dq,N |
1021 1601 77 53 1413 81599 543999 27199
1021 1601 179 359 1019 20399 95999 1199
1021 1601 1999 199 1199 203999 31999 3999
1021 1601 10019 479 779 101999 95999 5999
1229 1987 77 925 1367 2455 3971 3
1229 1987 5791 95 1213 2455 3971 3
1229 1987 7793 601 605 2455 7943 7
1229 1987 121121 501 1271 2455 3971 3
It is easy to note that Te,dp,dq,N = Te,dp,N ∩ Te,dq,N . Let us now 
provide some examples in Table 1. It is clear that while |Te,dp,dq,N | 
is quite large for one prime-pair, it is very small for the other.
Proposition 1
Consider CRT-RSA with N = pq, encryption exponent e 
and decryption exponents dp and dq. Let g1 = gcd(p−1, q −1), 
gp=gcd(edp−1, q−1), gq = gcd(edq −1, p−1) and ge = gcd(edp − 1, 
edq − 1). Then |Te,dp,N| = gp(p − 1) − 1, |Te,dq,N| = gq(q − 1) − 1 and 
|Te,dp ,dq ,N| = gp gq − 1. Further, 
2
1g − 1 ≤|Te,dp,dq,N|≤
2
eg − 1.
Proof
We have gp = gcd(edp − 1, q − 1). Then there exists a 
subgroup Sq of order gp in 
*
q  such that for any qw S∈ , we have 
q|wgp − 1. Now consider any *1 pw ∈ and w2 from Sq. By CRT, 
there exists a unique *NW ∈ such that W ≡ w1 mod p and 
W ≡ w2 mod q, and vice versa. Thus the number of such 
W’s is gp(p − 1). It is evident that for all these W’s, we have 
gcd(W, N) = 1 and N|W edp−1 − 1. We can also observe that any 
, ,pe d NW T∈  can be obtained in this way. Discarding the case 
W = 1, we get | Te,dp,N | = gp(p − 1) – 1.
Similarly, we have gq = gcd(edq − 1, p − 1). Then there 
exists a subgroup Sp of order gq in 
*
p  such that for any 
pw S∈ , we have p|wgq − 1. In the same manner, we get 
|Te,dq,N | = gq(q − 1) – 1.
Now consider any 1 pw S∈  and 2 qw S∈ . By CRT, there 
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A simpler algorithm by Coron5, than Coppersmith4 has 
been presented in this direction, but it was asymptotically less 
efficient. Later, a simpler idea by Coron6 than Coppersmith4 
has been presented with the same asymptotic bound as in 
Coppersmith4. Both the works of Coron5,6 depends on the result 
of Howgrave-Graham8.
The results of May14, in finding the deterministic 
polynomial time algorithm to factorise N from the knowledge 
of e, d, uses the techniques presented by Coppersmith4 & 
Coron5. Further, the work of Coron and May7 exploits the 
technique presented in howgrave-graham9.
2. DETERMINISTIC POLYNOMIAL TIME 
ALGORITHM
In this section we consider that both dp, dq are known apart 
from the public information N, e. We start with the following 
lemma. In the following results, we consider 1p N γ≈  as the bit 
size of p can be correctly estimated in log N many attempts.
Lemma 1
Let  =e N α , 1pd N
δ≤ , 2qd N
δ≤ . Suppose p > q and 
1p N γ≈ .  If both dp, dq are known then one can factor N in 
deterministic poly(log N) time if 2α + δ1 + δ2 ≤ 2 − γ1.
Proof
We have edp − 1= k(p − 1), edq − 1= l(q − 1) for some 
positive integers k, l. 
So, ( 1)( 1)
( 1)( 1)
p qed ed
p qkl
− −
− −=
Let 
( 1)( 1)p qed ed
NA
− −=
Now
1 2 1
2
( 1)( 1)
( 1)( 1)
( ) 2 2
( 1)( 1)
p q
N p q
p q N p q
ed ed p q
N
kl A ed ed
N
− − −
− −
+ α+δ +δ +γ −
− = − −
≈ ≤
 
(neglecting the small constant). 
So, as long as, 2α + δ1 + δ2 ≤ 2 − γ1, we have kl A=    . 
After finding kl, one gets (p − 1)(q − 1) and hence p + q can be 
obtained immediately, which factorises N. In the next result, 
we use the idea of Coppersmith4.
Theorem 1
Let  =e N α , 1pd N
δ≤ ,  2qd N
δ≤ . Suppose p is estimated 
as 1N γ . Further consider that an approximation p0 of p is known 
such that 0p p N
β− < .
Let 
0 0 00 0 0
, ,p qed edNp p qk q l    = = =        and 
g = gcd(N –1,edq–1 + l0–l0N, edp–1 + k0– k0 N) = N
η 
If both dp, dq are known then one can factor N in 
deterministic poly(log N) time if 
α2 + αδ1 +2αβ +δ1β −2αγ1 −
2
1γ +αδ2 +δ1δ2 
+βδ2 −2γ1δ2 −2βη +2γη –η
2 −α−δ1 +β +2η −1 < 0 
provided 1+3γ1 − 2β − δ1 − α − η ≥ 0.
Proof
We have edp = 1+ k(p − 1) and edq = 1+ l(q − 1). So 
1
1
ped
pk
−
−= . We also have 00
ped
pk = .
Then,
 
0 1 1
0 0 0
1 2
0 1
p p p p ped ed ed ed ed p p
p p p p ppk k N
− − α+δ +β− γ
−− = − ≈ − = ≤
Considering
00
N
pq = , it can be shown that 1
1 2
0q q N
+β− γ− < , 
neglecting the small constant. Assume, 2q N γ= , where γ2 =1–γ1 . 
So if we take 
00
qed
pl = . 
then  
0 0
0 2 1 2 2
0
1
0 1
1 2 2 1
q q q q
q
ed ed ed ed
q q q q
ed q q
qq
l l
N N
−
−
− α+δ + +β− γ − γ α+δ +β−
− = − ≈ −
= ≤ =
Let k1 = k − k0 and l1 = l − l0. We have edp + k − 1= kp. So 
edp + k0 + k1 − 1= (k0 + k1)p. Similarly, edq+l0+l1−1=(l0 + l1)q. 
Now multiplying these equations, we get 
(edp − 1+ k0)(edq − 1+ l0)+ k1(edq − 1+ l0)
    + l1(edp − 1+ k0)+ k1l1 =(k0 + k1)p(l0 + l1)q
Now if we substitute k1, l1 by x, y respectively, then 
(edp − 1+ k0)( edp − 1+ l0)+ x(edq − 1+ l0)
    + y(edp − 1+ k0)+ xy =( k0 + x)p(l0 + y)q
hence we have to find the solution k1, l1 of
(edp − 1+ k0)( edq − 1+ l0)+ x(edq− 1+ l0)
    + y(edp − 1+ k0)+ xy =( k0 + x)p(l0 + y)q
i.e., we have to find the roots of f ′ (x, y) = 0, where
f ′ (x, y) = (1 − N)xy + x(edq − 1+ l0 − l0N)
    + y(edp−1+k0−k0N)+( edp− 1+ k0)( edq− 1+ l0) − k0 l0 N.
We have 
g = gcd(1 − N, edq − 1+ l0 − l0 N, edp − 1+ k0 − k0N)= N
η .
Let ( , )( , ) f x ygf x y
′= , X = 1 1
2N α+δ +β− γ and Y = 2
1N α+δ +β− . 
Clearly X, Y are the upper bounds of (k1,l1), the root of f.  
Thus,
 
( ) 0 0
1 2 1
( 1 )
2
 ,  
 = N
qX ed l l N
g
XlN
g
W f xX yY − + −
∞
α+δ +δ +β−γ −η
= ≥
≈
Then from Coppersmith4 we need 
2
3XY W< , which 
implies 
2α + δ1 + δ2 +2η< 3 + 4(γ1 − β)                       (1)
If one of the variables x, y is significantly smaller than 
the other, we give some extra shifts on x or y. Without loss of 
generality, let us assume that k1 is significantly smaller than 
l1. Following the ‘extended strategy’ of Jochemsz and May
11, 
we exploit extra t many shifts of x where t is a non-negative 
integer. Our aim is to find a polynomial f0 that share the root 
(k1,l1) over the integers. We define two sets of monomials as 
follows.
{ }
0
: is a monomial of ,i k j i j m
k t
S x y x y f+
≤ ≤
= ∪
{monomials of : }i j i jM x y f x y S= ∈
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From Jochemsz and May11, we know that these 
polynomials can be found by lattice reduction if 1 2 s s sX Y W<  
for 1 2 \i i i jj x y M Ss ∈= ∑  
where s S= , j=1, 2. One can check that
223 7 5
1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ts m m t mt= + + + + + ,
23 7
2 2 2 2s m m t mt= + + + + , 
and s = (m + 1)2 + mt + t
Let t = τm. Neglecting the lower order terms we get that 
1 2 .s s sX Y W<  is satisfied when
( )( ) ( )
( )( )
23 3
1 1 22 2 2
1 2 1
2   2 (  )  1
1  2      
τ+ + τ α + δ + β− γ + + τ α + δ +β−
< + τ α + δ + δ + β− γ − η  
i.e., when
( ) ( )
( )
1
1 2
2
1 1 12 2 2
3
12 2
  2 3 1
2 2 0
δ βα
δ +δ
+ + − γ τ + α + δ + β− γ − + η τ
+ α + + β− γ − + η <
In this case the value of τ for which the left hand side of 
the above inequality is minimum is 1 1
1 1
1 3 2
2
+ γ − β−δ −α−η
α+δ +β− γτ = . As 0τ ≥ , 
we need 1 11 3 2 0+ γ − β− δ −α −η ≥ . Putting this optimal value 
of τ we get the required condition as
2 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 2
2
2 1 2 1
2 2
2 2 2 2 1 0
α +αδ + αβ+ δ β− αγ − γ + αδ + δ δ
+βδ − γ δ − βη+ γη−η −α −δ +β+ η− <
The strategy presented by Jochemsz and May11 works in 
polynomial time in log N. As we follow the same strategy, N can 
be factored from the knowledge of N, e, dp, dq in deterministic 
polynomial time in log N.
As the condition given in Theorem 1 is quite involved, we 
present a few numerical values in Table 2.
Corollary 1
Let  =e N α , 1pd N
δ< ,  2qd N
δ< .
Let g = gcd(N − 1, edp − 1, edq − 1) = N
η . 
If N, e, dp, dq are known then N can be factored in 
deterministic polynomial time in log N when
 2α + δ1 + δ2 +2η< 3.
Proof
Since in this case we do not consider any approximation 
of p, q, we take β = γ. Putting this value of β in Inequality 1, we 
get the desired result.
For practical purposes, p, q are same bit size and if we 
consider that no information about the bits of p is known, 
then we have 11 2 2   γ = γ = β = . In this case, we require 
2 2 31 1
1 2 1 2 1 22 2 4     2  0α + αδ + αδ + δ δ − η − α − δ − δ + η − < a s 
well as 3 12   0− δ −α − η ≥ .
As discussed in Section 1.1, if |Te,dp,dq,N | is small, then one 
can easily prove the deterministic polynomial time equivalence. 
however, this idea cannot be applied when |Te,dp,dq,N | is large. In 
such an event, our lattice based technique provides a solution 
for certain ranges of dp, dq. In all our experiments we start with 
large g1, e.g., of the order of 100 bits. In such cases, |Te,dp,dq,N | 
is large as 21 1g −  ≤|Te,dp,dq,N | following Proposition 1. One may 
note that the g1 in Proposition 1 divides the g in Theorem 1.
Let us now present some experimental results in Table 3. 
Our experiments are based on the strategy of Coron5 as it is 
easier to implement. We have written the programs in SAgE 
3.1.1 over Linux Ubuntu 8.04 on a computer with Dual CORE 
Intel(R) Pentium(R) D 1.83 ghz CPU, 2 gB RAM and 2 MB 
Cache. We take large primes p, q such that N is of 1000 bits. 
We like to point out that the experimental results cannot reach 
the theoretical bounds due to the small lattice dimensions.
Table 2. Numerical values of α, δ1, δ2, β, γ1, η following Theorem 1 
for which N can be factored in poly(log N) time
α δ1 δ2 β γ1 η
1.01 0.5 0.5 0.44 0.5 0.1
1.02 0.45 0.5 0.47 0.5 0.06
1.01 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.5 0.02
0.97 0.51 0.51 0.5 0.5 0.02
1.00 0.47 0.47 0.5 0.5 0.03
1.01 0.40 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.04
1.01 0.35 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.06
Table 3. Experimental results corresponding to Theorem 1
N (bit) p 
(bit)
q 
(bit)
e 
(bit)
dp 
(bit)
dq 
(bit)
G1 
(bit)
LD (m, t) #MSBp L3-time 
(s)
1000 500 500 1000 250 250 100 25 (3, 0) 20 93.40
1000 500 500 1000 203 313 100 30 (3, 1) 20 187.49
1000 500 500 1000 150 150 120 16 (2, 0) 0 14.84
1000 500 500 1000 150 270 120 30 (3, 1) 20 180.70
1000 500 500 1000 330 330 80 25 (3, 0) 60 108.36
1000 500 500 1000 300 300 150 25 (3, 0) 70 109.18
LD = lattice dimension, m, t are the parameters, and #MSBp = number of MSBs of p
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3. CONCLUSION
Towards theoretical interest, we have presented a 
deterministic poly(log N) time algorithm that can factorise N 
given e, dp and dq for certain ranges of dp , dq. This algorithm is 
based on lattice reduction techniques.
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